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Abstract
Background: Bitcoin system, when more than 51% computing power is controlled by
a single node, the block chain can be distorted maliciously. This is called 51% attack
which is a well-known potential risk that could destroy the Bitcoin system.
Method: The paper proves that under the current proof-of-work mechanism,
computing power eventually will be centralized at a single node if miners are rational
enough.
Result: The paper propose a new proof-of-work mechanism that improves
decentralization and reduces the risk of 51% attack without increasing the risk of Sybil
attack.
Concusions: This new mechanism introduces a series of principles such as Career
open to all talents, without distinction of birth, Distribution according to labor and All
Men are created equal.
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Background
Bitcoin, a peer-to-peer electronic currency, is a distributed ledger system (Nakamoto
2009). Every transaction is broadcast and verified by all nodes in the network through a
particular consensus mechanism (Bonneau et al. 2015; Yermack 2013). Every node col-
lects transactions in a block and the block is associated with a difficult mathematical
problem. Solving that problem is called mining, and nodes that mine coins are called
miners. The miner that solves the problem first secures the right to append the block
to the current longest block chain. Once confirmed, the new block chain is then copied
to every node in the network (Narayanan et al. 2016). The longest block chain is the
consensus of all nodes, which records all transactions in the history.
Decentralization is the presiding feature of distributed ledger systems like Bitcoin. This
feature, which contracts with other modern systems, are overseen by intermediaries. For
example, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT)
is central to the global payment system, such as, commercial banks for credit markets
and central banks for monetary markets. All these centers prominent in other systems
exert what is reasonably called political power, but Bitcoin functions without them. Bit-
coin’s supporters embrace the network’s decentralization and have been proposing more
aggressive formats such as a decentralized autonomous organization (Bannon 2016). A
decentralized ledger can bemaintained by a proof-of-work (POW) consensusmechanism
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and reward incentive engineering. POW requires that nodes engage in mining to report
verified blocks. This mining process consumes energy, time, and capital, but it prohibits
malicious and penalty-free reporting.
The POW mechanism is essential to network security. Satoshi uses a binomial
random walk model to prove that attackers must control 51% of the computing power in
the system before they can generate the longest block chain by constructing fraudulent
transaction records. This possibility known in the Bitcoin community as 51% attack is a
major concern of Bitcoin system security. Although it seems unlikely that a single node
could control more than half of the system’s computing power, the computing power is
actually controlled by a few major mining nodes (Fig. 1). We call this phenomenon com-
puting power centralization. Some researchers also observe such phenomenon (Beikverdi
and Song 2015). In this study, we aim to show how it can appear in a decentralized sys-
tem. Moreover, will centralization eventually destroy the Bitcoin’s decentralized system?
(Gervais et al. 2014). We show that the computing power can be concentrated in a single
node under the current POW design. When computing power is centralized, politi-
cal power becomes decentralized. Therefore, we propose a new POW mechanism that
encourages more nodes to participate in mining and reduces risk of a 51% attack.
Bitcoin mining
Mining Bitcoins requires significant computational resources. The Bitcoin network over-
all finds a block every 10mins, and locating a block in late 2014 necessitated computing
1021 SHA-256 hashes. Clearly, miners must invest in suitable computer hardware. First
generation machines were CPUs in PCs , but it was impossible for CPUs to mine Bit-
coins speedily as the difficulty of mining intensified. The second generation machines
was GPUs on display cards, but miners found that only specialized and sophisticated
machines, like ASIC, could earn profits. Successful miners update equipment quickly,
and those who do not invest continuously and extensively in current-generation hardware
must exit the industry or face the likelihood of never mining a single block out within
Fig. 1 Bitcoin computing power distribution
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their lifetimes. Facing conditions of perpetual escalation, miners join pools, wherein
they aggregate computational resources and share the rewards. Currently, pooled mining
constitutes 72% of the Bitcoin’s computation network.
Security
There are three blatant types of attacks on Bitcoin’s security: Sybil attacks, block with-
holding attacks, and 51% attacks.
A Sybil attack uses multiple IDs to achieve its purpose. That is, one person or entity
controls what appear to be multiple miners (Eyal and Sirer 2013; Miers et al. 2013).
In a block withholding attack, a miner who finds a winning solution, withholds it
from the pool. This undermines earnings of everyone in the pool, including itself. Luu
et al. (2015) studied a power-splitting games and showed that such attacks impair the
system.
A 51% attack is described above and discussed in Nakamoto (2009). Some observes
argue that 51% attacks are not incentive-compatible because attackers act to their own
detriment (Vasek et al. 2014). As explained in Kroll et al. (2013), however, that is not
necessary the case. For example, attackers who beforehand took short positions in
Bitcoin-related equities, profit from the resulting price erosion.
Methods
Suppose Miner i owns percentage pi of the system’s total computing power. In Satoshi’s
design, mining difficulty can be adjusted per the time to create the last 2016 blocks to
assure new blocks can be created every 10 min. We assume this interval is fixed. A similar
analysis appears in (Rosenfeld 2011) but it disregards the Bankrupt Probability.
We define the investment in mining hardware by Miner i as mi. Mining consumes
energy. We denote the energy cost for a single time interval as ei. After mining n epochs,
the total cost is (miri + ei)n where ri is the interest rate for one interval. We assume a
Bitcoin’s price, noted as bp, is constant and one block’s reward is N Bitcoins.
Profit and loss analysis
We are interested in miner i’s reward process. We can define an event of miner i




0, 1 − pi.
We take the process {Iik , k = 1, 2, 3, ..., n, ...} as an identical independent distribution




Iik ∗ N ∗ bp − (ei + miri) ∗ n.
Ri follows a binomial distribution with the mean and variance indicated below:
μ(Ri) = N ∗ bp ∗ n ∗ pi − (ei + miri) ∗ n. (1)
And its variance is
σ 2(Ri) = n ∗ N ∗ bp ∗ (pi + p0)(1 − pi − p0) = (n ∗ N ∗ bp) ∗ (pi − p2i ).
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The business is sustainable only if μ(Ri) exceeds 0. That is, a solo miner survives if its
computing power ratio satisfies:
pi
ei + miri >
1
N ∗ bp . (2)
The above condition can be regarded as a criterion for screening qualified miners.
The first lucky time analysis
Lead times for acquiring the first coin are important for small miners. If it takes too long
to complete the first block, the miner loses money and confidence. Even the miner who
satisfies (2), it may not be sufficiently patient or wealthy to await the arrival of fortune’s
coming. Suppose the maximum tolerable loss for miner i is Ci which can be interpreted
as a kind of budget.
We define the maximum tolerable time Bi
Bi = Ciei + miri . (3)
IfMiner i cannot obtain a single block posted before Bi, he quits the business. Therefore,
we investigate the time between any two consecutive events. As {Ii} is indeed a Bernoulli
process, the interval can be described by the following exponential distribution Xi with
the rate parameter = 1/pi.
P(Xi > Bi) = e−piBi .
This can be interpreted as the probability of bankruptcy for miner i. By introducing (2),
we have,
P(Xi > Bi) = e−
piCi
ei+miri .
This probability increases with mi and ei and decreases with pi, meaning that higher
mining chances reduce the risk of bankruptcy.
We assume Miner i is risk-neutral and accepts business only when his probability of
bankruptcy is less than β . Then, we have,
e−
piCi
ei+miri < β .
It is followed that,
pi




Equations 2 and 4 present this circumstance for small miners as follows:
pi
ei + miri > max
{− lnβ
Ci
, 1N ∗ bp
}
From the above analysis, the term pi/(ei + miri) can be used to interpret the competi-
tiveness of a miner. A miner with a larger pi/(ei + miri) has less ruin risk.
Big pools dominate Bitcoin mining. Pools encourage individual miners to join, and
accumulate computing power and profits for every node in the pool when a coin has been
generated.
Suppose the pool Miner 0 has proportion p0 of the system’s computing power. By defi-
nition, p0 > pi. Miner i joins Miner 0, forming the enlarged pool Miner j. We first prove
that miner j has a lower probability of bankruptcy than node i.
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Proposition 1 A smaller miner always reduces its probability of bankruptcy by joining
a larger miner.
Proof For the newly formed mining pool j, define Ijk :
Iik = Ii0 = Ijk =
{
1, pi + p0,
0, 1 − pi − p0.
The chance that Miner i will verify a block increases to pi + p0, but it receives only part
of the reward each time it does so. We can rewrite
Ri = pipi + p0
n∑
k=0
Iik ∗ Nbp − (ei + miri) ∗ n.
We then can show that,











This variance is much smaller than the original variance. Therefore, small miners can
reduce its risk as the variance is reduced.
Proposition 2 The bigger miner is better off if a smaller miner joins it.
Proof Similarly, we have
μ(R0) = np0,










Although the reduction in variance is not as substantial as Miner i. Miner 0 is better off.
If pooling benefits both parties, why would they not pool? The answer explains the
centralization of computing power and shows that even big miners have motivation to
collaborate.
Proposition 3 Pooling all miners produces the lowest variance.
Proof Proposition 3 follows from Propositions 1 and 2.
Results
If pooling works, we can make pooling as part of a new consensus mechanism described
as below. The essential of the new mechanism is trying to separate the Reporting Right
and the Rewarding Value, and it treats the whole system as a single pool. It turns out a set
of Socialism-style principles are introduced in the newmechanism includingDistribution
according to labor, A career open to all talents, without distinction of birth, All Men are
created equal and The People’s Congress Mechanism. Improvements on Bitcoin are not
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new, interested readers can find alternatives in (Andrychowicz et al. 2014; Heilman 2015;
Karame et al. 2012; Kokoris-Kogias et al. 2016; Poelstra 2014).
A Socialism Bitcoin
Step 1. Design amathematical problem that hasN solutions rather than a single solution.
Miner imay not find all solutions but a proportion of all solutions, for example, αi∗N
solutions.
Step 2. Once a miner finds out N solutions, he broadcasts his finding. Once miner i
receives this message, he completes his work and reports the value αi. When all αj,




Step 3. Randomly generate a number b from (c, 1), cmust be greater than a cutoff value,
for example 0.1 and choose the miner whose αi is closest to b and let him submit
the block. That is, it is not the miner who finish first submit the block. We introduce
this randomness to further reduce the 51% attack risk.
Explanation: As Bitcoin is presently designed, miners must find a 32-bit nonce that
causes its hash to be under a given target. Miners that find a valid nonce can submit their
block.We label this aspect of Bitcoin’s design asWinners get all. Miners with greater com-
puting power have more chances to contribute to the formation of the longest consensus
chain, creating the alternate phenomenon: richer becomes richer.
If a problem hasmultiple solutions, it may be possible to record howmuch effortsMiner
i makes to identify a solution at a specific time. This finding would facilitate choosing
miners from a number of miners rather than a single miner. We label this principle Career
open to all talents, without distinction of birth.
By introducing the concept of partial solutions, every miner’s work can be mea-
sured and appreciated. Measuring the workload requires the engineering introduced in
Section Implementation details. We call this principle Distribution according to labor.
The new source of randomness that we introduce in this new protocol grants every
node equal right to be selected to report the block. Doing so renders a 51% attack impos-
sible because the chance to report the block is independent of computing power. It will
not discourage miners from contributing as those with large computing power earn large
rewards as they contribute more. We treat reporting right as a form of political power and
the computing power as a form of economical power. Our new protocol eliminates the
inevitability that miners with greater economical powers acquire greater political power,
a principle we call All Men are created equal.
However, granting every node the right to report a block may engender Sybil attacks. A
Sybil may duplicate numerous malicious nodes that entail little cost but augment chances
to receive reporting rights. To reduce the risk of Sybil attacks, we introduce parameter c,
which significantly increases the cost of an attack. In other words, not every participant
has reporting rights, only those that finished more than c ∗ N solutions. We call this The
People’s Congress Mechanism.
Introducing these principles achieves multiple benefits:
1. Every miner’s risk of bankruptcy is reduced without sacrificing access to rewards,
thereby increasing the system’s stability.
2. It reduces the risk of 51% attack.
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3. It is also not vulnerable to Sybil attack.
4. It also reduces the risk of Block withholding attack as reporting is not a solo.
Implementation details
Implementing our protocol requires solving at least two engineering issues:
1. New puzzle design. It can be done by decreasing the difficulty of the original
Bitcoin’s nonce searching problem and set the value of N according to some rule in
order to guarantee a constant Bitcoin output rate.
2. α counter. It is an essential engineering problem to count αi in every miner. The
counter should be smart enough to remove duplicated solutions and store all
correct ones. This issue is related to the first one. The design of the problem may
lead to different counting methods.
Conclusion
Economists (Böhme et al. 2015) recognize that Bitcoin has the potential to be a fertile
area for social science research. Scholars should appreciate Bitcoin’s contained environ-
ment with a clear set of rules (albeit not free from frictions), the publicly available record
of transactions (unusual for most means of exchange), and the general availability of data
even beyond the block chain (including market prices and trading volumes). The notion of
Bitcoin as a social science laboratory is particularly attractive. We have proposed a pro-
tocol that introduces some socialism principles to reduce the risk of a 51% attack while
encouragingminers’ continued participation in the network. This study is far frommature
and as noted issues of implementation need to be detailed. It nonetheless warrants future
research from social scientists.
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